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One aspect of consciousness phenomena, the temporal emergence of visual
awareness, has been subject of a controversial debate. How can visual awareness,
that is the experiential quality of visual stimuli, be characterized best? Is there a sharp
discontinuous or dichotomous transition between unaware and fully aware states, or
does awareness emerge gradually encompassing intermediate states? Previous studies
yielded conflicting results and supported both dichotomous and gradual views. It is
well conceivable that these conflicting results are more than noise, but reflect the
dynamic nature of the temporal emergence of visual awareness. Using a psychophysical
approach, the present research tested whether the emergence of visual awareness is
context-dependent with a temporal two-alternative forced choice task. During backward
masking of word targets, it was assessed whether the relative temporal sequence of
stimulus thresholds is modulated by the task (stimulus presence, letter case, lexical
decision, and semantic category) and by mask type. Four masks with different similarity
to the target features were created. Psychophysical functions were then fitted to the
accuracy data in the different task conditions as a function of the stimulus mask SOA
in order to determine the inflection point (conscious threshold of each feature) and
slope of the psychophysical function (transition from unaware to aware within each
feature). Depending on feature-mask similarity, thresholds in the different tasks were
highly dispersed suggesting a graded transition from unawareness to awareness or
had less differentiated thresholds indicating that clusters of features probed by the
tasks quite simultaneously contribute to the percept. The latter observation, although
not compatible with the notion of a sharp all-or-none transition between unaware
and aware states, suggests a less gradual or more discontinuous emergence of
awareness. Analyses of slopes of the fitted psychophysical functions also indicated
that the emergence of awareness of single features is variable and might be influenced
by the continuity of the feature dimensions. The present work thus suggests that the
emergence of awareness is neither purely gradual nor dichotomous, but highly dynamic
depending on the task and mask type.
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INTRODUCTION
Elucidating the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying
phenomenal consciousness (Block, 1995), that is, the experiential
qualities of sensations, remains one of the greatest and
most exciting scientific endeavors in the 21st century. One
particular challenge in the scientific explanation of phenomenal
consciousness is the privacy of subjective experiences (Nagel,
1974), which renders an objective assessment of the phenomenon
in question difficult. However, an adequate characterization
of consciousness phenomena is an important prerequisite
for determining the underlying neuro-cognitive mechanisms
(Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Kiefer et al., 2011).
One aspect of consciousness phenomena, the temporal
emergence of visual awareness, has been subject of a controversial
debate (for a review see, Windey and Cleeremans, 2015). A first
class of proposals assumes that visual awareness is a phenomenon
gradually developing over time ranging from unawareness over a
coarse glimpse to full awareness of the visual stimulus (Dennett
and Kinsbourne, 1992; Overgaard et al., 2006; Seth et al., 2008).
A second opposing class of proposals argues that consciousness
is an all-or-none phenomenon (Sergent and Dehaene, 2004;
Quiroga et al., 2008; Sekar et al., 2013; Asplund et al., 2014).
These proposals state that the transition between unawareness
and full awareness of a stimulus proceeds in a binary fashion.
A third class of intermediate proposals suggests independently
accessible levels of representation such as physical energy, simple
visual features, letters, word forms and meaning (Kouider et al.,
2011; Windey et al., 2013; Windey and Cleeremans, 2015). States
of full awareness include access to all levels of representations,
whereas in complete unawareness there is no access to any
level. Most critically, this class of proposals also assumes states
of partial awareness, in which observers only experience the
informational content of some restricted levels. According to
different variants of this partial awareness hypothesis, access to
the different levels of representation either exclusively occurs in
an all-or-none fashion (Kouider et al., 2011) or might depend
on the feature type: Conscious access to low-level visual features
(such as energy, geometrical elements, lines and color) is assumed
to occur in a gradual fashion, whereas access to higher-level
features (e.g., word form or meaning) is supposed to be all-
or-none (Windey et al., 2013; Windey and Cleeremans, 2015).
Higher-level features of visual stimuli referring to lexical (word
form) or semantic representations (meaning) transcendent the
information provided by the visual sensory channel and can be
characterized as multimodal or even amodal in some aspects
(Kiefer and Pulvermüller, 2012). In keeping the terminology with
previous research and for simplicity reasons, we use the term
“visual awareness” throughout this paper also in the context
of these higher-level features, in order to express that their
representations are accessed from visual stimuli.
Most previous studies addressing the temporal emergence of
visual awareness used subjective awareness ratings of the clarity
of the percept as primary variable of interest (e.g., Sergent and
Dehaene, 2004; Overgaard et al., 2006; Windey et al., 2013).
Such subjective measures based on introspection were preferred
over objective measurements of discrimination performance
based on signal detection theory, because the latter measures
can also capture the influence of unconscious processing and
cannot be taken as an exclusive index of visual awareness
(Sandberg et al., 2011). Furthermore, as objective awareness
measures based on signal detection theory typically average
detection performance over a series of trials, they do not consider
the entire performance distribution. However, the validity of
subjective ratings of introspective experience in single trials has
also been controversially discussed: Subjective ratings might be
affected by response biases and cannot be necessarily taken as
direct reflections of subjective visual experience (Snodgrass and
Shevrin, 2006; Asplund et al., 2014; Schmidt, 2015).
In addition to these measurement problems, previous studies
yielded heterogeneous results (for a discussion see, Bachmann,
2013) supporting all-or-none (Sergent and Dehaene, 2004;
Quiroga et al., 2008; Sekar et al., 2013; Asplund et al., 2014),
graded (Overgaard et al., 2006; Sandberg et al., 2010), or partial-
awareness proposals (Windey et al., 2013). Given that different
experimental blinding methods (visual masking vs. attentional
blink), different stimuli or stimulus features (low level vs. high
level) or masks (random pattern vs. random letters) were used in
the previous studies, it is well conceivable that these conflicting
results are more than noise, but reflect the dynamic and context-
dependent nature of the temporal emergence of visual awareness
(see also, Overgaard and Mogensen, 2016). We propose that,
depending on the specific stimulation context and blinding
method, the percept could emerge either in an all-or-none
or in a more graded fashion. Despite some differences (for a
discussion see, Breitmeyer et al., 2015), many current models
converge on the assumption that visual awareness requires
recurrent processing of the stimulus within multiple brain
systems, thereby consolidating its representation (Enns and Di
Lollo, 2000; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Lamme, 2003; Kiefer
et al., 2011). Consolidation through recurrent processing can
be characterized as reaching an attractor state within neural
networks (Herzog et al., 2016). Depending on the specific context,
the attractor state might be reached from previous intermediate
states of unconscious processing through relatively sharp or
smooth transitions resulting in a more dichotomous or gradual
emergence of awareness. Furthermore, again depending on the
context, the attractor state might encompass different neural
systems coding specific features of the stimulus. This would lead
to awareness of just a few or all stimulus features as suggested by
the partial awareness hypothesis (Kouider et al., 2011).
In line with such a dynamic and context-dependent view
of the temporal emergence of visual awareness, findings
with masking and attentional blink paradigms yielded quite
heterogeneous results depending on the specific stimuli used.
For instance, attentional blink paradigms with word, color or
face stimuli produced a data pattern consistent with an all-or-
none emergence of a visual percept (Sergent and Dehaene, 2004;
Asplund et al., 2014), whereas attentional blink paradigms with
letters were associated with a more gradual emergence of a visual
percept (Nieuwenhuis and de Kleijn, 2011). Masking experiments
with complex pattern masks, in contrast, frequently yielded
results consistent with a gradual emergence of consciousness
(Sergent and Dehaene, 2004; Sandberg et al., 2010).
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In order to address the issue whether visual awareness
emerges dynamically in a context-dependent fashion, in the
present study, we determined identification and discrimination
thresholds for stimulus features of varying complexity in
different masking contexts using a temporal two-alternative
forced choice task (temporal 2-AFC). This temporal 2-AFC
task has the advantage to provide an objective psychophysical
measurement of identification or discrimination performance as
an index of visual awareness with a comparable set of word
stimuli while minimizing biases from unconscious processing.
In the task, participants were presented with two stimulus-
mask sequences separated by a delay of 900 ms. The critical
task-relevant stimulus feature (energy or stimulus presence/letter
case/lexicality/semantics) randomly appeared either in the first or
the second interval. After the second sequence, participants were
prompted to indicate in which interval the designated stimulus
feature was presented. Above-threshold performance in this
temporal 2-AFC task most likely exclusively reflects awareness
of the critical feature, because response biases from unconscious
processing are minimized for several reasons: Semantic priming
elicited by unconsciously perceived masked stimuli have been
shown to decay rapidly after about 100 ms (Brown and Hagoort,
1993; Greenwald et al., 1996; Kiefer and Spitzer, 2000; Kiefer
and Brendel, 2006), while response tendencies initiated by
masked stimuli are even inhibited after this time interval
(Eimer and Schlaghecken, 2003). As the response in this task
is delayed after the second presentation interval, it is unlikely
that unconscious semantic priming or visuo-motor processes
were able to bias the response (see also, Milner and Dijkerman,
2001). Furthermore, the task requires the comparison of the
percepts in intervals one and two. We are not aware of any
evidence that such a complex comparison can be performed
on the basis of unconscious visual processes (Ansorge et al.,
2014).
Visibility of the word stimuli were manipulated by gradually
varying the target stimulus mask onset asynchrony (stimulus
mask SOA) according to a staircase algorithm. Psychophysical
functions were then fitted to the accuracy data of stimulus
detection (presence of an stimulus or energy) or discrimination
(letter case/lexicality/semantics) performance in the different
task conditions as a function of the stimulus mask SOA in
order to determine the conscious detection or discrimination
threshold (point of inflection of the logistic function, estimated
accuracy of 75%). A higher threshold indicates that the
stimulus has to be presented longer in isolation before mask
onset so that a given task-relevant feature can be consciously
identified.
In addition to thresholds, slopes of the fitted psychophysical
functions in the different conditions can also be determined.
A steep slope of the function is taken to index that visual
awareness of a given feature emerges in a more all-or-none
fashion, whereas a shallow slope is assumed to indicate
a gradual transition from unconscious to conscious at the
feature level (Koch and Preuschoff, 2007; Sandberg et al.,
2011). Hence, when analyzing thresholds and slopes of the
psychophysical function we can determine the relative timing
of access to consciousness across stimulus features (thresholds)
as well as the abruptness vs. smoothness of the transition
from the unconscious to the conscious within stimulus features
(slopes).
Our experimental approach using stimulus mask SOA as
variable to infer the temporal emergence of awareness within
the temporal 2AFC task is based on the following rationale:
The higher the threshold in terms of stimulus mask SOA, the
longer the stimulus requires processing within the visual system
to achieve consolidation before the mask interferes with its
processing. Based on these considerations, the stimulus mask
SOA provides information about the approximate time point, at
which masked stimulus features are sufficiently consolidated to
be available for conscious access as indicated by above-threshold
performance in the temporal 2AFC task (estimated SOA at
75% correct performance). Whether the observed time course
of features thresholds not only reflects the time course of
conscious access, but also the time course of phenomenal
experience critically depends on the plausible assumption that
visual awareness (subjective perceptual experience) and access
consciousness (above-threshold discrimination performance of
stimuli) exhibit an at least correlated time course. Furthermore,
our psychophysical approach informs us about the temporal
emergence of features only for briefly presented masked
stimuli, and is mute with regard to the relative timing of
stimulus features under unmasked conditions or for longer
stimulus duration. However, these limitations apply to all
experimental approaches to consciousness; whether the blinding
technique of choice is a masking or attentional blink paradigm,
or whether psychophysical measures such as thresholds and
slopes or subjective awareness ratings are used as index of
awareness.
Although psychophysical functions are necessarily fitted on
performance data of a series of trials, the threshold or slope
parameters of this function characterize the entire accuracy
distribution across single trials with varying stimulus mask SOAs
and are not simple average performance measures. Hence, the
criticism of objective awareness measures based on averages
across trials, as raised in the context of signal detection
theory mentioned above, does not apply to our psychophysical
approach.
The competing proposals of the temporal emergence of
visual awareness make different predictions regarding the
relative temporal ordering of thresholds for the different task-
relevant stimulus features and slopes of the psychophysical
functions. According to all-or-none proposals, thresholds of the
different features should be very similar, and psychophysical
functions should generally have a steep slope (Del Cul
et al., 2009). Proposals assuming a gradual emergence of
consciousness (Dennett and Kinsbourne, 1992; Overgaard et al.,
2006; Seth et al., 2008) as well as the partial awareness
hypothesis (Kouider et al., 2011; Windey et al., 2013; Windey
and Cleeremans, 2015), in contrast, predict that threshold
SOAs of the features should depend on their level of
complexity with energy (stimulus presence decision) having
the lowest threshold followed by letter form (capital letter
decision), word form (lexical decision), and meaning (semantic
decision).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 March 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 315
fpsyg-08-00315 March 1, 2017 Time: 15:12 # 4
Kiefer and Kammer Temporal Emergence of Visual Awareness
Although all variants of the partial awareness hypothesis
suggest a sequential contribution of stimulus features to the
conscious percept as a function of their complexity level, there is
a controversy how awareness of one particular feature emerges.
According to one variant, the transition from unawareness to
awareness for each feature occurs in an all-or-none fashion
(Kouider et al., 2011). This implies that threshold SOAs for the
features should show the temporal gradient described above, but
the slope of the psychometric function should be invariantly
steep. According to the other variant (Windey et al., 2013),
transition from unawareness to awareness for the different
features depends on their complexity level. Hence, this proposal
predicts both a temporal gradient of threshold SOAs and a
variation of slopes of the psychometric function: Awareness for
low-level features such as color should emerge gradually resulting
in a shallower slope of the psychometric function. Awareness
for higher-level features such as semantics should emerge in an
all-or-none fashion resulting in steep slopes.
Predictions with Regard to Threshold
SOAs in Relation to Mask Type and Task
Target-mask threshold SOAs indicate the time needed for visual
consolidation so that a given stimulus feature is available for
conscious access. In order to test the contextual dynamics
of visual awareness, we created four different masks, which
systematically varied with regard to their similarity with the
word targets (random pattern mask, false font mask, random
letter mask, and word mask). Masks are more efficient to
suppress stimulus visibility, when mask and target share common
features (Breitmeyer and Ög˘men, 2006). Likewise, comparable
similarity effects between targets and distractors have been
observed within the context of the attentional blink paradigm
(Maki et al., 2003; Dux and Coltheart, 2005). We therefore
predicted that higher-level masks (random letters, word) should
yield higher thresholds SOAs compared with low-level masks
(random pattern and false fonts). Most critically, in line with
the notion of a context-dependent dynamic emergence of visual
awareness, as outlined above, we expected that the relative
ordering of threshold SOAs in the different task conditions
(stimulus presence, letter case, lexicality, and semantic category)
is modulated by the type of mask: As the random pattern
mask does not bear any similarity with any task-relevant word
feature, all features should quite simultaneously contribute to
the conscious percept. Threshold SOAs in the different tasks
should be therefore similar or even identical indicating that the
conscious percept emerges in a more discontinuous, or even in an
all-or-none fashion. In contrast, for higher-level letter and word
masks, which specifically interfere with the lexical or semantic
levels of word representation, access to the corresponding
features of the percept should be delayed compared with low-
level features. We therefore expected to observe a greater
differentiation of threshold SOAs in the different tasks with these
higher-level masks. As a differentiation of thresholds indicates
that features can be discriminated more sequentially at distinct
stimulus mask SOAs, such a pattern of results would be consistent
with a more gradual emergence of visual awareness.
Predictions with Regard to the Slopes of
the Psychophysical Functions in Relation
to Mask Type and Task
The slopes of the psychophysical function index the transition
from unawareness to awareness within each task probing a
specific feature type (Koch and Preuschoff, 2007; Windey et al.,
2013). All-or-none proposals (e.g., Del Cul et al., 2009) predict
generally steep slopes (and comparable SOA thresholds for all
tasks). The analysis of slopes is suited to distinguish between
different variants of the partial awareness hypotheses, which
all predict a temporal gradient of threshold SOAs as outlined
above. If conscious access to individual features were generally
dichotomous as assumed in the framework by Kouider et al.
(2011), slopes of the psychophysical function in the different tasks
should be invariantly steep. In contrast, the partial awareness
framework proposed by Windey et al. (2013) and Windey
and Cleeremans (2015) predicts shallower slopes, i.e., more
gradual emergence of awareness, for low-level visual features
(energy, letter form) compared with higher-level word form or
semantic features, which should exhibit a more discontinuous
emergence of awareness. However, a further scenario is also
conceivable: The complexity of processing and thus the time
needed for consolidation may also influence the transition from
unawareness to awareness for individual features, resulting in
shallower slopes for features with longer threshold SOAs. As
described above, random letter and word masks may specifically
interfere with and thus delay the processing of higher-level
lexical and semantic features compared with the more neutral
pattern and false font masks. As a consequence, for higher-
level features the transition from unawareness to awareness
would be more gradual under random letter and word masks
resulting in shallower slopes in the lexical and semantic
tasks.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
Eighty-four subjects (mean age 22.3, 47 female) were recruited
for the study. They were native German-speaking volunteers
without any history of neurological or psychiatric disorders.
They participated after giving written informed consent and
they were compensated for participation either by money
or by course credits. The study has been approved by the
institutional review board of Ulm University. Sample size
was determined according to earlier psychophysical studies.
The effects of the four different masks were investigated
in a between-subject design (see below). Each subject was
randomly assigned to one of the four groups. Data collection
was stopped when the data of at least 16 subjects within
each group fulfilled the inclusion criteria for analysis (see
below).
Visual acuity was tested using FrACT (Version 3.7.1b, central
Landoldt-C, 4AFC, 30 trials, observer distance 2.5 m, Bach, 1996).
All subjects had a binocular visuals of 0.85 at minimum, and no
subject was excluded due to vision impairment.
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Stimuli and Apparatus
Five word lists comprising 50 pairs of stimuli were generated
from the CELEX lexical database (Baayen et al., 1995). Only
words with six characters were used. For the different tasks
(see below) different word lists were used (see Supplementary
Table S1), which were matched for word frequency and word
length.
Stimuli were generated using Psychopy (v1.78.01, cf. Peirce,
2007) and presented on a CRT screen (21′, iiyama, Hoofddorp,
The Netherlands) at a frame rate of 150 Hz. Target words
were flashed for one frame using the font Courier new with
a height of 0.38◦ in white (25 cd/m2) on a gray background
(5 cd/m2). According to the German spelling norms, first letters
were always written in capital, with the exception in the capital
task (see below). The mask with a duration of 30 frames (200 ms)
followed the target with an SOA varying from 1 to 50 frames,
i.e., 6.7–340 ms (Figure 1). Four different types of masks were
applied: (a) a pattern mask consisting of 4 × 28 squares, either
white (50 cd/m2) or gray (5 cd/m2, space averaged luminance
27.5 cd/m2) distributed at random, with a size of 3.5◦ by 0.5◦
covering the target words, (b) a random string of eight symbols
from a false font created using elements of Courier new, (c) a
random string of eight consonants, lower and upper cases mixed
at random, (d) an abstract word, semantically unrelated to any
FIGURE 1 | Schematic drawing of the tasks. Each of the four tasks consists of two target-mask sequences with target pairs (targets 1 and 2) representing the
respective task features: word and blank screen, word in upper and lower cases, word and pseudoword, natural object and artifact. Duration of target presentation
was one frame on the CRT screen. Stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between target and mask was identical in both target-mask sequences. It was adaptively
varied in order to measure discrimination thresholds for the given task between 6.7 ms (no blank frame between target and mask) and 340 ms (50 blank frames
between target and mask). Mask duration was 200 ms as depicted in the semantic condition, interval between the two target-mask sequences was 900 ms.
Subjects had to indicate by button press in which of the two intervals the feature of the given task was seen (response). The four masks depicted as inset in interval
1 for the absent/present task (pattern, false font, random strings, and abstract words) were not varied within subjects but were administered to four different groups
of subjects. The mask in interval 2 was always different to the mask in interval 1. The hash displayed at the begin of each interval and the question mark displayed
following mask 2 are not depicted. Notice that text sizes and mask sizes are enlarged in relation to the screen for sake of clarity. The fifth task (visibility) was identical
with the absent/present task, using only the shortest SOA of 6.7 ms.
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of the target words, with a length of eight characters chosen at
random from a list of 20 words, written with a capital at the
beginning followed by lower case letters (Figure 1). Symbol string
masks (b, c, and d) had the same height as target words (0.38◦)
and were two letters longer. Luminance of the three symbol string
masks was 50 cd/m2. The string masks covered about 30% of the
total space, resulting in a space averaged luminance of 18.5 cd/m2.
Subjects sat in front of a CRT screen with a distance of 1.5 m
in a room with dimmed ambient light. During the experiment
they responded with left and right index fingers, respectively, on
a keyboard.
Since timing of the target – mask sequence was critical in the
experiment, precision of sequences was tested externally using
a photodiode at the CRT screen during development of the
task. Test runs with variable SOAs demonstrated precise timing
without frame drops and with stable durations of target and mask.
Design of the Experiment
Participants performed five different two-interval forced choice
tasks with 50 trials each, in which discrimination thresholds for
a certain task feature were measured by adaptively varying the
target-mask SOA. A trial consisted of the presentation of two
target-mask sequences, finished by a temporal two-alternative
forced choice decision. The sequence started with a hash (#) for
500 ms followed by a blank screen for 500 ms. Then the target
word was flashed for one frame followed by the mask for 200 ms.
Target and mask were separated by a blank period with a variable
SOA of 6.7–340 ms. After a pause (blank screen for 900 ms
following the presentation of the mask), the second sequence
with identical timing parameters started with a hash. Thus, the
second sequence started 2100 ms + SOA after the first sequence.
Immediately after the end of the second sequence, a question
mark indicated the subject to respond. (Figure 1, for sake of
clarity the hash as well as the question mark are not depicted).
As responding in this task is delayed and unconscious priming
has been shown to decay rapidly after about 100 ms (Greenwald
et al., 1996; Kiefer and Spitzer, 2000; Kiefer and Brendel, 2006),
above-threshold performance in this temporal 2-AFC task most
likely exclusively reflects awareness of the critical feature, because
biases from unconscious processing are minimized (for a more
detailed discussion of this issue, see the introductory section).
The order of the first four tasks was counterbalanced over
subjects, followed by the 5th task, the visibility task, always at
the end of the experiment. The five tasks were: (i) Absent/present
task. In only one of the two target-mask sequences a word was
flashed, while in the other sequence only the mask was shown.
(ii) Capital task. In one sequence the target word was written
in capitals, in the other sequence the target word was written
in lower cases, including the first letter. (iii) Lexical decision
task. A word or a pseudoword was presented as target in the
sequences. (iv) Semantic task. One target word referred to a
natural object, whereas the other target word named a man-
made artifact. (v) Visibility task. Similar to the absent/present
task, in only one sequence a target word was presented. In
difference to the former task the target-mask SOA was fixed to
6.7 ms, and no discrimination threshold but a detection ratio
was measured. This task served to assess, whether stimuli were
entirely unconscious at minimal stimulus mask SOA.
Report categories (e.g., “In which interval was the word
written in capital letters?” vs. “In which interval was the word
written in lower case letters?”) were balanced over subjects. The
target-mask interval, in which the critical stimulus was present
(first or second interval), was varied randomly with the restriction
that the critical stimulus appeared equally often in the first and
second interval, respectively. Prior to each task, an instruction
text on the screen described the task (e.g., “In one interval a
word written in lower case letters will be presented, in the other
interval the word will be written in capital letters.”) and the
report category. Each task started with five training trials with a
fixed SOA of 173 ms. Then 50 trials with adapting SOAs were
presented. Two simple 2-down 1-up staircases were randomly
intermixed, 25 trials each, to achieve a good sampling across a
broad SOA range. The first staircase started at an SOA of 173 ms,
step size was 33 ms. The second staircase started at an SOA of
73 ms, step size was 20 ms.
The effects of the four different masks were investigated in
a between-subject design in order to keep the length of the
entire experimental session (about 1 h) manageable for the
participants. Furthermore, the number of available word stimuli
for the semantic condition was too small to allow for presentation
within a within-subject design without stimulus repetition. Each
subject was randomly assigned to one of the four groups, and in
each of the five tasks the same mask was used.
Data Analysis
In each individual and task, responses from the two staircases
were collapsed, and a psychometric function (Figure 2) was fitted
to the accuracy distribution as a function of target-mask SOA
using psignifit (v2.5.6, cf. Wichmann and Hill, 2001). The logistic
function
F(x) = γ+ 1− γ− λ
1+ e−β(x−α)
with α as threshold, β as slope parameter, γ as probability rate,
and λ as lapsus rate, was applied, with the free parameters α and
β while fixing γ = 0.5 and λ = 0. Please notice that an increase
in β yields a steeper psychometric function. Detection thresholds
(absent/present task) or discrimination thresholds (the other
three tasks) were defined as SOA with 75% correct responses
(point of inflection of the logistic function, α).
Thresholds and slopes were analyzed using a mixed-design
analysis of variance (ANOVA, Statistica V12, StatSoft, Hamburg,
Germany). Greenhouse-Geyser corrections were applied in
case of violation of sphericity (Mauchley’s test). We report
Greenhouse-Geyser’s ε together with the uncorrected degrees of
freedom. Post hoc analyses were performed using Newman–Keuls
tests.
Seventeen subjects (20%) had to be excluded. In nine subjects,
accuracy in the visibility task, in which masks were presented
at the shortest possible target-mask SOA, was above chance
performance [correct identification of 32/50 trials (64%) or more,
above chance performance according to binomial distribution,
p = 0.03]. We excluded these subjects from analyses of the
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FIGURE 2 | Examples of psychometric functions fitted on data of two subjects in different masking conditions. Top: participant in the pattern mask
condition, bottom: participant in the word mask condition. The four different tasks are depicted in different symbols and different colors. The size of the symbols
codes the number of presentations per SOA which differs due to the staircase procedures. In the examples the range of number of presentations is n = 1 (lower
graph, red square at 17 ms) to n = 17 (lower graph, blue triangle at 73 ms). The largest SOA of 173 ms is not included into the graph for sake of clarity (performance
1.0 in each task). Slope values in the order of the data labels: upper 1.33, 0.0499, 0.0729, 0.139; lower 1.33, 0.0862, 0.227, 0.110.
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main experiment, because it cannot be guaranteed that states
of complete unawareness were reached, even at the shortest
SOA. Performance above chance level at the shortest SOA does
not allow a reliable threshold estimation based on fitting of a
sigmoid function, because the lower left part of the function,
performance at random, is not reached. In the remaining eight
rejected subjects, thresholds could not be determined because
the psychometric function of one or several tasks could not
be adequately fitted due to a non-monotonous variation of
performance as a function of target-mask SOA. The number of
subjects included was: 17 (pattern mask), 17 (false font mask), 16
(random string mask), 17 (word mask).
RESULTS
Analysis of Threshold
Threshold data from 67 subjects were subjected to an omnibus
mixed-design ANOVA with the group factor MASK (four groups:
pattern, false font, random string, and word) and the within
factor TASK (four levels: absent/present, capital, lexical, and
semantic). Both factors revealed significant differences: group
factor MASK [F(3,63) = 5.0, p= 0.0036, η2p = 0.19], within factor
TASK [F(3,189) = 145.4, ε = 0.90, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.70]. Most
importantly, the interaction MASK × TASK was also significant
[F(9,189) = 2.97, ε = 0.90, p = 0.0026, η2p = 0.12] (Figure 3 and
Supplementary Table S2).
Regarding factor TASK, post hoc tests showed that lowest
thresholds were obtained with the absent/present task, followed
by capital and semantic tasks, whereas the lexical decision task
resulted in highest thresholds (all comparisons p< 0.005). These
post hoc tests thus revealed a gradient of awareness thresholds
as a function of the task-relevant stimulus feature. Post hoc tests
for the factor MASK indicated that thresholds were similar for
mask 1 (pattern) and mask 2 (false font, p > 0.25). Thresholds
for both masks were significantly lower compared to mask
3 (random string, pattern p = 0.019, false font p = 0.015)
and mask 4 (word, pattern p = 0.033, false font p = 0.018).
Thresholds for masks 3 and 4 did not differ from each other
(p> 0.25).
In order to assess the complex interaction between the
influences of MASK and TASK on awareness thresholds in more
detail, subsidiary ANOVAs were calculated (Table 1). Firstly,
between group analyses are reported comparing the impact of the
four different masks on one of the four different tasks (Table 1A
and Figure 3). In the absent/present task different masks did
not significantly affect thresholds [between group comparison,
F(3,63) = 2.33, p = 0.083, η2p = 0.10]. This shows that all masks
were equally effective in interfering with the ability to consciously
report the presence of a stimulus. For the remaining three tasks,
capital, lexical, and semantic, the different masks significantly
affected thresholds. In the capital task, mask 3 (random string)
yielded significantly higher thresholds compared to mask 1
(pattern, p = 0.0097) and to mask 2 (false font, p = 0.014).
Threshold with mask 3 (random string) was higher than that
obtained with mask 4 [word; although this difference did not
reach conventional significance levels (p = 0.066)]. Thresholds
with mask 4 (word) did not significantly differ from those of mask
1 (pattern, p= 0.25) and mask 2 (false font, p> 0.25).
A different pattern was observed for the two remaining tasks,
lexical and semantic. In these higher-level tasks, mask 3 (random
string) and in particular mask 4 (word) yielded the highest
thresholds. In the lexical task, thresholds obtained with mask
3 (random string, p = 0.043) as well as with mask 4 (word,
p = 0.021) were higher than thresholds with respect to mask 1
(pattern). Furthermore, the thresholds with mask 4 (word) were
significantly higher than those of mask 2 (false font, p = 0.044).
For mask 3 (random string), the difference to mask 2 (false fonts)
just failed to reach conventional significance levels (p = 0.055).
Finally, in the semantic task only thresholds obtained with mask
4 (word) were significantly higher compared to the thresholds
obtained with mask 1 (pattern, p = 0.009) and mask 2 (false
font, p = 0.016). Thresholds with mask 3 (random string) did
not significantly differ from those of mask 1 (pattern, p = 0.085)
and mask 2 (false font, p > 0.25) and those of the mask 4 (word,
p= 0.20).
To summarize, the different tasks interfered differently with
the different masks. In the absent/present task, thresholds did not
differ across masks. Whereas in the capital task highest thresholds
were obtained applying mask 3 (random string) followed by mask
4 (word), in the lexical and semantic task the highest thresholds
were seen with mask 4 (word) and mask 3 (random string),
although only thresholds with mask 4 consistently differed from
both those of mask 1 (pattern) and mask 2 (false font). Thresholds
with mask 1 (pattern) and mask 2 (false font) were always below
mask 3 (random string) and mask 4 (word).
Secondly and most importantly to the purpose of the present
study, we determined the threshold pattern of the different tasks
within each masking condition. To this end, for each masking
condition, a repeated-measure ANOVA with the within factor
TASK was performed. For all masks, the factor TASK was
significant (Table 1B and Figure 3). However, congruent with
the interaction task × mask obtained in the omnibus ANOVA,
the tasks elicited a differential pattern of thresholds depending
on the masking condition. While the absent/present task yielded
significantly lower thresholds compared to the other three tasks
in all masks (all p < 0.001), the pattern of thresholds in the
other tasks differed across masks. Thresholds in the capital and
semantic tasks were comparable for mask 1 (pattern. p = 0.11),
mask 2 (false font, p = 0.072) and mask 3 (random string,
p > 0.25), but significantly differed from each other only with
mask 4 (word, p < 0.001). Thresholds of the semantic task were
comparable to those of the lexical task for mask 1 (pattern,
p = 0.078). For the other masks, thresholds were consistently
and significantly higher for the lexical than the semantic task
(mask 2: p = 0.004, mask 3: p = 0.027, mask 4: p = 0.002).
With all four masks, the capital task differed from the lexical
task (mask 1: p = 0.004, mask 2: p < 0.001, mask 3: p = 0.028,
mask 4: p < 0.001). To summarize, while the absent/present task
consistently exhibited the lowest threshold across all masking
conditions, the threshold pattern of the other tasks varied as a
function of the mask. For mask 1 the thresholds for the capital,
lexical and semantic tasks were least differentiated with only a
significant difference between the capital and lexical tasks. For
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FIGURE 3 | Thresholds for each task (SOA in ms) in each of the four mask groups. Depicted are mean values and the ±95% confidence interval. Please
notice that dotted lines connecting the given task over the four different masks connect results from the four different groups.
TABLE 1 | Subsidiary analysis of variance (ANOVAs).
(A) Within a given task: effect of the between-subject factor mask.
Task df F p η2p
Absent/present 3,63 2.33 0.083 0.10
Capital 3,63 4.14 0.0096 0.16
Lexical 3,63 4.25 0.0085 0.17
Semantic 3,63 4.52 0.0062 0.18
(B) Within a given masking group: effect of the within-subject factor task.
Mask df F p ε (G–G) η2p
Pattern 3,48 26.8 <0.001 0.629 0.63
False font 3,48 37.7 <0.001 0.70
Random string 3,45 21.8 <0.001 0.59
Word 3,48 92.2 <0.001 0.85
mask 4, in contrast, the threshold pattern was most differentiated
with significant differences between all three tasks. The threshold
pattern for masks 2 and 3 showed an intermediate form of
differentiation with diverging thresholds for the lexical task on
the one hand and those of the capital and semantic tasks on the
other hand.
Analysis of Slopes of the Psychometric
Functions
Slopes of the fitted psychometric functions were analyzed
(similar to threshold measures) by an omnibus mixed-
design ANOVA with the group factor MASK (four groups:
pattern, false font, random string, and word) and the within
factor TASK (four levels: absent/present, capital, lexical, and
semantic). Only the factor TASK yielded significant effects
[F(3,189) = 23.3, ε = 0.85, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.27, Figure 4 and
Supplementary Table S3], whereas the group factor MASK
[F(3,63) = 0.073, p > 0.5, η2p = 0.004] as well as the interaction
MASK × TASK [F(9,189) = 0.92, p > 0.5, η2p = 0.04] were not
statistically significant. Post hoc tests showed that slopes for the
absent/present task were steeper compared to the other three
tasks (p < 0.001). The other task conditions did not differ from
each other.
Analysis of Visibility Task
Mean performance accuracy in the visibility task (absent/present
at constant SOA of 6.7 ms) for all subjects included into the
analysis (n= 67, see Materials and Methods) was 51.5%± 0.62%,
range from 38 to 62%. An ANOVA comparing the performance
accuracy over the four mask groups revealed no systematic
difference [F(3,63) = 0.5, p > 0.25, η2p = 0.02]. This suggests that
masks were similarly effective at the smallest SOA.
DISCUSSION
The present study assessed the temporal emergence of visual
awareness by determining the awareness thresholds of stimulus
features of varying complexity using an objective psychophysical
approach. In order to obtain a measure of the temporal
dynamics of awareness, stimulus visibility was varied by
manipulating target-mask SOA according to a staircase
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FIGURE 4 | Slopes of the psychometric functions, grouped by factor TASK. Depicted are mean values ± 95% confidence interval.
algorithm. Feature-specific discrimination thresholds were
determined by fitting psychophysical functions to the accuracy
distribution across trials as a function of target-mask SOA. Our
approach has the advantage over detection measures based on
signal detection theory that the fitted psychophysical function
reflects the entire performance distribution and is not an
average measure. Furthermore, our temporal 2-AFC choice task
minimizes responses based on unconscious processing. Hence,
in line with general psychophysical approaches to threshold
measurements (Kingdom and Prins, 2016), our paradigm is
suited to yield valid information about the temporal emergence of
stimulus features contributing to a percept. We specifically tested
whether the dispersion of feature discrimination thresholds
depends on the context by varying the similarity between mask
and stimulus. Such an interaction between feature type and
mask would indicate a context-dependent dynamic emergence of
visual awareness.
One might argue that psychophysical measures based on
performance in masking experiments, e.g., thresholds as a
function of the SOA as in our study, are not informative with
regard to the emergence of visual awareness per se, but simply
reflect resilience of different visual processes to mask interference
or the ability of visual processes to handle two stimuli (target
and mask) in parallel. We do not think that these alternative
interpretations contradict our interpretation, because they
interpret the data at a different theoretical level. Less interference
by the mask should be related to a higher discrimination accuracy
at shorter SOAs (i.e., a lower threshold), which in turn should
index that phenomenal awareness of the stimulus feature is
reached after shorter processing, i.e., temporally earlier. As we
already have laid out in the section “Introduction,” in order
to be able to make inferences from behavior to the content of
phenomenal consciousness, we must make the plausible (but
difficult to validate) assumption that phenomenal consciousness
(subjective experience) and access consciousness (here: above-
threshold discrimination performance) are at least correlated in
time.
Furthermore, one could deny the assumption of a temporal
correlation of threshold SOAs and the time course of the
emergence of subjective experience. One could instead
alternatively postulate that the time course of emergence into
awareness is completely uncoupled from earlier processing stages
we characterized by measuring threshold SOAs. This alternative
assumption, however, seems implausible, since processing
within neural networks typically occurs in a cascading fashion:
Information from earlier processing stages is immediately
transmitted to further stages so that temporal characteristics
from earlier processing stages are still present or even more
exaggerated at later stages (Humphreys et al., 1988; Kammer
et al., 1999).
Context-Dependency of Feature
Thresholds: Emergence of Awareness
across Feature Types
In line with our predictions, the type of the mask significantly
influenced the relative sequence of feature thresholds SOAs.
Although stimulus presence decisions (awareness of stimulus
energy) had consistently the lowest threshold SOAs across
masks, the differentiation of thresholds for the other features
was strongly influenced by the specific masking context. For
pattern masks, which do not show any similarity with any target
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feature, thresholds for the capital, lexical and semantic tasks were
comparable with only a significant difference between the capital
and lexical tasks. For the word mask, which has a high similarity
with the target words at all levels of representation (energy, letter,
lexical and semantic level), the temporal differentiation of feature
thresholds was largest, with significant differences between all
four tasks. Finally, the sequence of thresholds for the false font
and random letters masks, respectively, which bear similarity
with the target words only at the energy and letter level, showed
an intermediate form of differentiation with diverging thresholds
only for the lexical task on the one hand and those of the capital
and semantic tasks on the other hand.
When considering the sequence of feature threshold SOAs,
the least differentiated dispersion of thresholds under the pattern
mask, although not compatible with the notion of a sharp
dichotomous transition between unaware and aware states,
suggests a less graded and more discontinuous emergence of
awareness (Sergent and Dehaene, 2004; Sekar et al., 2013;
Asplund et al., 2014): The absence-presence task had the
lowest thresholds suggesting that stimulus presence (‘energy’)
is rapidly consciously accessible. However, the more complex
letter, lexical or semantic features exhibited significantly higher
thresholds and thus contributed later, but almost simultaneously
to the percept. In contrast, the high temporal differentiation
of thresholds under the word masks suggest that awareness of
letter, semantic and lexical word features emerges sequentially,
consistent with both a gradual emergence of consciousness
(Dennett and Kinsbourne, 1992; Overgaard et al., 2006; Seth
et al., 2008) and the partial awareness hypothesis (Kouider
et al., 2011; Windey et al., 2013; Windey and Cleeremans,
2015). The observed interaction between feature type and mask
type shows that the temporal emergence of visual awareness
is highly flexible (see also, Overgaard and Mogensen, 2016)
and can be more discontinuous or gradual depending on
the context (here mask type). Hence, these results support
our proposal that the transition between unconscious and
conscious visual perception can be characterized as reaching
an attractor state within distributed brain areas (Herzog et al.,
2016). Depending on the context, the attractor state might
involve different visual and non-visual areas coding specific
types of stimulus features at either comparable (discontinuous
transition) or dispersed (graded transition) time points of visual
processing.
In contrast to our and others’ (Kouider et al., 2011)
predictions, lexical word features (lexical decisions) exhibited
consistently across mask types (except for the pattern mask)
higher thresholds than semantic word features (semantic
decisions), although semantics is typically considered to be a
higher representational level compared to lexical representations
(McClelland and Rogers, 2003). Two mutually not excluding
explanations of this unexpected finding are possible: (i) As
pseudowords were created from real words by exchanging a
few letters, a greater perceptual clarity is required to be able
to successfully differentiate between words and pseudowords,
in particular with similar masks. For semantic living/non-living
decisions and the other tasks, the decision categories are
better differentiated so that less perceptual clarity is needed.
(ii) Awareness of word meaning might emerge earlier than
awareness of lexicality (see also Anzulewicz et al., 2015) because
semantic processing of the living/non-living dimension depends
on an extended network of brain areas in fronto-parietal and
occipital areas compared with lexical processing (Kiefer and
Pulvermüller, 2012), which involves relative restricted areas in
temporal cortex (Cohen and Dehaene, 2004). It is possible that
activity within the larger semantic brain network accumulates
faster within reverberating processing loops to reach the ignition
level necessary for awareness (Noy et al., 2015).
Context-Dependency of Slopes of the
Psychophysical Functions: Emergence
of Awareness within Features
In addition to feature threshold SOAs, we also analyzed the slopes
of the fitted psychophysical function within each task: A shallow
slope is taken to index a gradual transition from unawareness to
awareness for a feature probed by a given task, whereas a steep
slope indicates a discontinuous or even a sharp dichotomous
transition (Koch and Preuschoff, 2007; Del Cul et al., 2009;
Windey et al., 2013). Within the context of the partial awareness
framework, one variant assumed an all-or-none emergence of
awareness for single features, which should result in generally
steep slopes (Kouider et al., 2011). According a second variant
of the partial awareness framework, awareness of higher-level
semantic features is assumed to be dichotomous resulting in
relatively steeper slopes in contrast to the gradual emergence
of awareness for lower-level perceptual color features leading to
shallower slopes (Windey et al., 2013; Windey and Cleeremans,
2015). We further assumed that slopes for higher-level word
and semantic features would be shallower for the random letter
and word masks compared with pattern and false font masks,
because random letter and word masks should specifically delay
the processing of lexical and semantic word features.
In contrast to our or others’ expectations, we found
the steepest slopes for the absent/present task independent
of masking suggesting a rather discontinuous emergence of
awareness. Slopes for the higher-level letter, lexical and semantic
discrimination tasks were shallower than for the absent-present
task and did not differ from each other. This suggests that for
features more complex than the detection of stimulus presence
(‘energy’) awareness seems to evolve more gradually.
When interpreting the slope parameter of a psychophysical
function the following issues must be considered: Slopes cannot
be classified as being “steep” or “shallow” without any reference,
e.g., another psychophysical function with a different slope.
However, in our view this holds true for any investigation in
perceptual performance. We believe that any psychophysiological
process evolves in time due to the functional properties of
neurons within their networks. From that perspective, any
perceptual process can be described with a transition function,
which normally is sigmoidal. This formally contradicts the
concept of a true step function, which might be the underlying
concept of an “all-or-none” mechanism in perceptual awareness.
However, a sigmoid function, where the transition between
performance at chance level and performance without error
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happens within a few milliseconds, as for the absent/present task
in the present study, looks like a step function. Such a very brief
transition phase, although formally different from a true step
function, could indicate a discontinuous emergence of awareness.
We are also aware that the slope value is related to the
resolution of the abszissa and therefore, the first is influenced by
the latter. Simulations with idealized data showed that using the
present step size of 6.7 ms for the stimulus-mask SOA the steepest
slope obtainable was 1.33. Decreasing the step size of the SOA to
2 ms (which is difficult to achieve with standard CRT monitors)
would increase the steepest obtainable slope to 4.0. With respect
to our results (steepest slopes in absent/present condition, mean
slope value 0.759, Supplementary Table S3) we would therefore
not expect a substantial change in the relation of the slope pattern
in the present study. Of course, the magnitude of the slope can be
characterized with more precision, when the step size of the SOA
variation are smaller.
The pattern of slopes (steeper slope for energy than for
higher-level features) was incompatible with our expectations
and with earlier findings (Windey et al., 2013). We speculate
that slopes of psychophysical functions and thus the transition
from unawareness to awareness for a given feature are highly
flexible and depend among other factors on the dimensional
continuity of the features probed in the task (see also,
Windey and Cleeremans, 2015): Dimensional continuity between
blue and red hues, but also between living and non-living
concepts is more continuous compared with stimulus absence
vs. presence or with integer number magnitude, which are both
intrinsically discontinuous. It is conceivable that awareness of
a feature on a continuous dimension emerges rather gradually
compared with features on discontinuous dimensions, which
give rise to sharp transitions between unaware and aware
states. As outlined in the introduction, the attractor state
related to visual awareness might be reached from previous
intermediate states of unconscious processing through relatively
sharp (discontinuous feature dimension) or smooth (continuous
feature dimension) transitions resulting in a more dichotomous
or gradual emergence of awareness. Of course, this explanation
is only tentative and has to be tested in future studies. Also
contrary to our expectations, the slopes for lexical and semantic
features were not modulated by the masks, i.e., they were
not shallower for random letter and word masks, which are
assumed to more strongly delay processing of these features
compared with pattern and false font masks. It must remain
open, whether the slopes for each feature type are relatively
invariant and generally insensitive for influences of the different
masks. Alternatively, it is possible that modulation of the slopes
by the masks can be found under stimulation conditions,
in which the influence of the mask is putatively stronger,
for instance when the target stimuli are presented at lower
contrasts.
CONCLUSION
By using a psychophysical approach, the present study shows
that the temporal transition between unaware and aware states
is modulated by the context: Depending on the mask, word
features (except energy) contribute almost simultaneously to
the percept suggesting a more discontinuous transition from
unawareness to awareness or had quite dispersed threshold
SOAs indicating a highly temporally graded transition. A high
similarity between the probed feature and the mask appears
to be an important factor to induce a graded emergence of
awareness across stimulus features. Analyses of slopes of the
fitted psychophysical functions also indicated that the temporal
emergence of awareness of single features is variable and might
be influenced by the continuity of the feature dimensions. The
present work thus suggests that the emergence of awareness is
neither purely gradual nor dichotomous, but highly dynamic
and context-dependent at both the stimulus and feature level.
Future studies could combine psychophysical measurements of
thresholds and slopes with subjective ratings of awareness in the
search for convergent evidence regarding the temporal dynamics
of visual awareness.
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